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Failure to scramble jets for South Tower

Summary

The thing is, none of the planes should have been able to reach their targets if standard procedures about hijackings were followed. Not one of them. For the moment, let's let the first plane slide on the shock factor. But with hijackings, standard procedure has fighter jets intercepting within about ten minutes of any sign of a hijacking.

Let's go through a quick timeline.
United Flight 175, the second plane, the one that hit the South Tower, takes off at 8:14 (exactly when suspicions are raised that the first plane, American 11, might have been hijacked. At 8:42, transponder and radio go off and plane goes off course. At 8:43 FAA notifies NORAD. They already know the first plane is hijacked, and three minutes later, they'll know that it hit the WTC.

That should have made for a real sense of urgency, no?

Fighter jets should have intercepted Flight 175 by 8:53. Didn't happen. At 9:03 it crashes into the South Tower. No fighter jets in pursuit, no nothing.

The first official accounts said no planes were scrambled until after the Pentagon was hit, when they knew "what the threat was." Weird, right there. You'd think the latest they could have known what the threat was would be 8:46, when the first plane hit, not 9:38 when the Pentagon was hit. But this version of the story disappeared, and a second one came out.

In the second version of the story, fighter jets were scrambled right away, but they arrived too late. In this version, NORAD wasn't notified about Flight 11 until 8:40 (which would have been a massive failure on the part of the FAA), though they admit hearing about Flight 175 at 8:43.

The second version continues with the claim that jets weren't scrambled for Flight 175 until 8:52, and not from the nearest base (McGuire in New Jersey), but from Otis in Cape Code, 170 miles away. Even so, the F-15s still could have made New York in about 8 minutes, allowing the standard 2.5 minutes to get airborne and reach top speed of some 1,875 mph. That leaves 3 minutes to spare.

But in the official story, the planes were still 70 miles away at 9:03. According to NORAD's timeline, it took them 19 minutes to reach NYC. If so, the fighters were going at well under half the top speed, or about 700 mph. From McGuire AFB, planes could have arrived in under 3 minutes and easily intercepted the flight. So why weren't the F-15s ordered from McGuire?

But then the official story was changed again. In the new one, based on the supposed "NORAD tapes", the military knew nothing about any hijackings until all the planes had crashed. It was all the FAA's fault.

The massive and implausible failures of standard operating procedures seem to suggest there were "stand down" orders intended to allow the attacks to succeed.

Source: Griffin, p. 9-11.

Analysis

It seems generally known that fighter jets intercept off-course planes on a fairly regular basis, 60-100 times a year or more. It is, as they say, standard procedure. Plane goes off course, call the fighter jets. They don't immediately shoot a plane down, they just intercept it, check it out. If a hijacking is suspected, damn sure fighter jets are in the air in under 3 minutes.

20-25 minutes notice may not seem like a lot of time to regular people, but to a fighter jet, it's a massive window for action. There's no excuse for the Pentagon plane at 9:38, but even these first two should never have made it. Standard procedures would have caught them all.

The latest official story about the FAA failing to notify the military until everything was crashed is riddled with problems and contradicted by FAA and other insider testimony; it is absurd and implausible. This is extremely, majorly, highly suspicious.

Bottom line, me, I give it:

extremely suspiciousextremely suspiciousextremely suspiciousextremely suspicious

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